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RICHMOND: TAKE MY MORTGAGE, PLEASE!

The burst of the housing bubble brought challenges for many homeowners,
as the value of their homes spiraled downward and many were forced into
foreclosure. This, in turn, has caused difficulties for cities, as the vacant and
abandoned neighborhoods have become a hub for blight and transience, and
the tax base has steadily declined. In an effort to combat these issues,
Richmond, California’s mayor, Gayle McLaughlin, has teamed up with
Mortgage Resolution Partners, LLC. The pair plans to use Richmond’s power
of eminent domain to “take” underwater mortgages and then refinance them,
selling the new mortgages to investors. The plan, however, has met staunch
resistance from many, including banks, which represent the current mortgage
holders, as well as the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which challenges the
wisdom and legality of such a plan. In the battle that has ensued, both sides
are standing strong. The opponents are especially worried that a victory for
McLaughlin could spur other cities into action, resulting in huge losses for
investors. This article posits that while Richmond’s plan is bold and likely has
legitimate intentions, its constitutionality is questionable and its
implementation could bring about catastrophic results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On Homer Avenue on the east side of Cleveland, Ohio, vacant homes litter
the landscape. Although fewer than twenty houses line the street, seven of them
sit empty and only two of those have been boarded and secured by the city. The
vacant homes are in various states of disrepair. Their yards fill the weeds in
the summer and a multiplicity of insects breed in the grass. Most of the houses
have broken windows, chipped paint, and dislodged gutters. One house draws
a number of people who engage in illicit activities during the evening hours. In
addition to the empty houses, three once-vibrant commercial buildings sit
empty as well. The factory at the end of the street provides one function for the
neighborhood; teenagers amuse themselves from time to time by breaking the
factory windows with rocks, leaving shattered glass strewn about the street.
Two boarded school buildings dominate the other end of the street. Loose
bricks occasionally cascade from the second stories, crashing to the street
below. Although the current owner removed the rickety and rusty fire escapes
that children previously climbed, poison oak plants still run the length of the
building.1
This scene is not an unfamiliar one for residents of cities across the
country. Spurred by the burst of the housing bubble and the great recession,
vacancy and abandonment continue to cause significant problems for cities.2
The problem is multifaceted. The abandoned homes mark the deterioration of a
neighborhood, inviting blight, crime, and transience. Even one dilapidated
property signals to homeowners and potential buyers alike that the
neighborhood is not a good investment.3 Malcolm Gladwell discusses this in
his book, The Tipping Point:
If a window is broken and left unrepaired, people will conclude that no one
cares and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken and the
sense of anarchy will spread from the building to the street on which it faces,
4
sending a signal that anything goes.

1. This hypothetical comes from the experience of Matthew J. Samsa. Matthew J. Samsa,
Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance Suits and Land Banks to Pursue
Economic Redevelopment, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 190 (2008).
2. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 355 (2006).
3. James J. Kelly, Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210, 212 (2004).
4. This summary of Broken Windows Theory, from the journalist and author Malcolm
Gladwell’s book, The Tipping Point, demonstrates how behavior is shaped by our environment—
even by details that may at first seem small. Id. (quoting MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING
POINT 141 (2000)).
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These visible environmental details shape behavior.5 Just as one would expect
that if a mugging occurs, it does so in a graffiti-filled subway tunnel or similar
locale, one would expect that when crime occurs, it does so in a depressed
neighborhood full of vacant, dilapidated houses.6 Not only is such a
neighborhood a convenient site for hosting criminal activity, but the vacant
houses also tell everyone that the neighborhood is the type of place where
criminal activity is expected.7 As people in a neighborhood see that
dilapidation and crime are expected, neighborhoods decline in a vicious cycle.8
This problem is compounded by the reduction of the tax base that necessarily
follows when homeowners are forced out of their homes.9 Cities face a twopronged attack—they have more problems to solve and less money with which
to solve them.
In its exploration of Richmond, California’s plan to use eminent domain to
take mortgages that are underwater (the “Richmond Plan”), this article
discusses the factors leading to, and the potential consequences following, the
Richmond Plan.10 Following this introduction, Part II gives a brief background
of eminent domain. Part III of this article discusses the factors leading to the
burst of the housing bubble and examines the way in which it contributed to
large numbers of foreclosures across the country, especially in Richmond. Part
IV of this article will outline Richmond’s plan to combat blight by working
with Mortgage Resolution Partners, LLC (MRP) to use its eminent domain
power to take approximately 600 houses that are underwater. In Part V, this
article outlines the current status of the Richmond Plan. Next, Section VI
analyzes the constitutionality of the Richmond Plan, focusing specifically on
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While this article briefly touches
upon other potential constitutional challenges to the plan, the article’s main
focus is the Takings Clause. This article posits that despite the Supreme
Court’s deference to the legislature, the Richmond Plan may have some real
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. (citing MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 142–50 (2000)).
Id. at 212–13.
Id.
See id.
Samsa, supra note 1, at 191; see also MORTG. RESOLUTION PARTNERS,
HOMEOWNERSHIP PROTECTION PROGRAM: A SOLUTION TO A CRITICAL PROBLEM 6 [hereinafter
MRP] (“Consider, for example, a home that was purchased for $400,000 with a $360,000
mortgage and has a current tax assessment of the purchase price. If that home sells in foreclosure
for $200,000, its tax assessment is reset and can only increase by a small amount each year in
many communities.”).
10. The city of Richmond, California, led by Mayor Gayle McLaughlin, is still planning to
move forward with the use of eminent domain to take mortgages that are currently underwater. At
least four other cities that considered using eminent domain to take underwater mortgages have
backed down, deciding that it is too risky. Shaila Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against
Blight, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmondcalifornia-a-long-shot-against-blight.html.
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issues with the Takings Clause. In Part VII, this article urges that while the
plan is creative and well intentioned, it will ultimately cause more harm than
good. Not only is the legality of Richmond’s action questionable, but it also
threatens to have just the effect it is meant to solve; it will give a significant
windfall to a private company and to individual Richmond homeowners who
may have taken out too risky of loans, while ultimately hurting the often
working-class individuals who have invested in residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) trusts and the people of Richmond who will likely have a
difficult time procuring future financing.11 The Richmond plan could cause a
snowball effect, allowing cities to intervene to break any number of private
contracts, further hurting private investors and turning the mortgage industry
on its head. Especially at a time when the industry is recovering, this simply
does not make sense.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN
Before undertaking an analysis of the Richmond Plan, it is necessary to
outline the basics of eminent domain. Eminent domain comes from the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment12 and applies to state governments
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 An attribute
of governmental power or sovereignty, eminent domain is a process whereby
the government is allowed to compel a transfer of property rights in return for
just compensation.14 For example, if the government wants to build a highway
that must run in a relatively straight line, the government may use eminent
domain to take the requisite property from the property owners who are
unwilling to sell their land.15
In order to be constitutional, however, exercises of eminent domain must
satisfy both statutory and constitutional requirements.16 Specifically, eminent

11. In 2008, John McCain suggested using federal bailout money to buy troubled mortgages
and write them down. However, this plan failed because the rules governing many of these pools
forbade the trustee, or investor’s representative, from selling or modifying the mortgages unless
they were already in default, even if sale or modification would be in the investors’ interests. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.”).
13. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (“The
conclusion of the court on this question is, that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
compensation for private property taken for public use constitutes an essential element in ‘due
process of law,’ and that without such compensation the appropriation of private property to
public uses, no matter under what form of procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions of
the Federal Constitution.”).
14. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1220
(2d ed. 2012).
15. See id.
16. Id. at 1221.
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domain may only be deployed for a “public use,”17 and the government must
pay “just compensation” for the property.18 However, these terms can be
difficult to interpret. Initially, state courts held that “public use” meant that the
property had to be taken for “use by the public.”19 Yet the Supreme Court only
requires that the property be used for the public advantage or benefit and has
given great deference to the legislature in determining whether a taking
satisfies the “public use” requirement.20 Just as the meaning of “public use” is
not intuitive, “just compensation”21 can be difficult to define.22 Since eminent
domain is typically used when negotiations for a market transaction break
down, “fair market value” becomes a hypothetical guess about what the
property should have received if transfer of the property had been voluntary.23
However, the formula used by the courts does not take into account factors
such as subjective value; as a result, it cannot be an exact figure.24
Having discussed the basics of eminent domain, this article will now
explore the factors leading toward Richmond, California’s novel plan to use its
eminent domain power to take mortgages that are underwater.
III. CITIES IN DISTRESS
The first step in understanding the Richmond Plan is to explore the factors
contributing to the plan’s birth by examining the expansion and burst of the
housing bubble, and then by specifically zeroing in on Richmond’s situation.
The vicious cycle of foreclosure and neighborhood decline began in cities
across the United States with the burst of the housing bubble25 and the great
recession.26 Large numbers of homeowners who invested in houses they could
barely afford when the market was at its peak are now underwater on

17. Id.
18. Id. at 1245.
19. “Use by the public” meant that property could be taken for highways, parks, railroads,
etc., that would be used by the public, but not for a private home or factory. Id. at 1221 (citing
Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV.
615, 633 (1940)).
20. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, at 1221–22.
21. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), and MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14,
at 1250–54, for further discussion of “just compensation.”
22. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, at 1245–46.
23. Id. at 1250.
24. See id. at 1252–53. See generally Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The
Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013).
25. DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH , THE HOUSING BUBBLE FACT
SHEET 3 (2005), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/housing_fact_2005_
07.pdf.
26. See M. Hampton Foushee, Eminent Domain, Mortgage Backed Securities, and the Limits
of the Takings Clause, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 66, 69–70 (2013).
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mortgages,27 meaning that they owe more—sometimes significantly more—
than the homes are currently worth.28 Faced with this dilemma, many
homeowners will default on their mortgage payments, either out of necessity or
because of a cost-benefit analysis.29 These defaults subject the homes to
foreclosure or abandonment and have had the effect of decimating
neighborhoods.30 The decimation has plagued cities, not only increasing the
crime, blight, and transience, but also reducing the tax base, making it more
difficult for cities to take action to fix the problem.31 In Irvington, New Jersey,
for example, the city has spent $14 million in response to various hazards
related to vacant homes, all the while struggling with dropping property
values.32 As cities struggle, they have looked high and low for solutions.
One such city is Richmond, California, a city near San Francisco that was
hit hard by the burst of the housing bubble.33 Following the burst, Richmond’s
mayor, Gayle McLaughlin, began working with MRP on a novel program.34
The city plans to use eminent domain to take mortgages that are underwater
and refinance them, hopefully creating more manageable monthly payments.
This would allow homeowners to remain in their homes, help to stabilize the
community, and lead Richmond out of the great recession, though it has yet to
move forward implementing this creative solution.35 This plan has been the
subject of harsh criticism and staunch opposition from many, including banks,
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), and even a Richmond realtors’

27. An underwater mortgage is an outstanding mortgage on which the homeowner debtor
owes more on the mortgage than the market value of the house. For example, the Smiths might
have purchased a home in 2006, when the home was worth $400,000. The Smiths currently owe
$360,000 on their home; however, due to the burst of the housing bubble, this home is now worth
only $260,000. Thus, the Smiths are $100,000 underwater on their investment. See America’s
Housing Market: Not waving but drowning, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2014, http://www.economist.
com/news/finance-and-economics/21592644-radical-plan-help-underwater-homeowners-makescomeback-not-waving [hereinafter ECONOMIST].
28. Id.
29. Roger Lowenstein, Walk Away From Your Mortgage!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t.html?_r=0.
30. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 212–13.
31. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191.
32. Joe Tyrrell, NJ Town Turns to Eminent Domain to Clean Up Blight of Foreclosed
Houses, NJ SPOTLIGHT, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/11/19/nj-townturns-to-eminent-domain-to-clean-up-blight-of-foreclosed-houses/?p=all.
33. Dewan, supra note 10.
34. Id.
35. Id. Because Richmond has not yet taken action toward seizing mortgages, mortgagebond trustees have dismissed their lawsuits due to lack of ripeness until or unless Richmond
chooses to use its eminent domain power to take mortgages. Sam Forgione, Investors withdraw
appeals against eminent domain plan, REUTERS, May 16, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/05/17/us-mortgages-investing-eminentdomain-idUSBREA4G00A20140517.
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association.36 In the legal battle that has ensued, many are left wondering what
the implications of this novel plan will be if it succeeds.37
A.

The Housing Bubble Burst

In order to understand the challenges Richmond is facing, it is vital to
consider the burst of the housing bubble. From 1950 to 1995, house prices
grew at the same rate as other goods and services after adjusting for inflation—
the normal and sustainable pattern for market growth.38 However, after 1996,
house prices began rising substantially—growing 45% after adjusting for
inflation.39 In fact, in 2005, housing construction constituted approximately 5%
of GDP,40 and each week roughly 140,000 families purchased a home.41 Some
regions saw an increase in home prices of 60%.42 Generally, when prices in an
industry rise, it is because of growth in population or income, or because of
other natural factors.43 Yet during this particular period of growth, there was
no substantial rise in either population or in income to explain the huge
increase in the market.44 Significantly, as the housing market increased, the
rental market remained relatively steady, which is unique because home prices
and rental prices typically increase or decrease at a similar rate.45 The increase
in the housing market was especially high on the East and Pacific coasts.46
While it is not surprising that houses on the coasts would be more expensive
than houses in other regions, there is still a limit to how much people will pay
to live in these areas.47 In situations such as this, the economies are eventually
unable to function until housing prices are reduced to a competitive price.
At the same time house prices were rising, the ratio of home equity to
home value plummeted, reaching a near record low in 2005.48 In June of 2006,
US residential housing prices were at their peak,49 and buyers, who had
become accustomed to a strong market and the idea of home ownership as an
investment, borrowed blindly due to the high equity offered by the homes.50

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Dewan, supra note 10.
Id.
Baker, supra note 25, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 1.
Baker, supra note 25, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
MRP, supra note 9, at 3.
See Baker, supra note 25, at 3.
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Yet these buyers bought homes they could barely afford.51 Unfortunately, this
meant that when homes began to lose value, many homeowners owed more on
their mortgages than their homes were worth.52 The same homeowners were
left with either no choice but to default because of the strained economy or a
strong incentive to default.53
Defaults ultimately result in large numbers of foreclosures, and the large
numbers of foreclosures can result in vacant and abandoned houses.54 From
2000 to 2010, the number of vacant housing units increased by 4.5 million, or
44%.55 Most of the losses have occurred in older industrial cities that have lost
jobs and population over the past several years.56 In fact, more than half of the
twenty cities that were the largest in 1950 have lost at least one-third of their
populations.57
Yet these defaults, which have been so hard on homeowners and cities,
have been hard on mortgage holders as well.58 While banks hold a large
amount of mortgage debt, mortgage-backed securities, a market that exceeded
$6 trillion in 2005, hold most of the mortgages.59 Mortgage-backed securities
include local pension plans, 401(k) plans, college savings plans, insurance
companies, mutual funds, university endowments, and government-sponsored
enterprises.60
B.

The Richmond Problem

Foreclosures and abandonment hit many cities hard, propelling them to
take action. One such city is Richmond, a refinery town with a population of

51. Tamara E. Holmes, 5 Lessons from the Housing-Bubble Bust, MSN REAL ESTATE,
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=23468447 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
52. Baker, supra note 25, at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
54. See Samsa, supra note 1, at 191.
55. ALLAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM, LAYING THE
GROUNDWORK FOR CHANGE: DEMOLITION, URBAN STRATEGY, AND POLICY REFORM 3 (2012).
56. Id.
57. Timothy Williams, Blighted Cities Prefer Razing to Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/us/blighted-cities-prefer-razing-to-rebuilding.html?_r
=0.
58. Baker, supra note 25, at 4.
59. Baker, supra note 25, at 4; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
26, Wells Fargo Bank et al. v. City of Richmond, Cal. et al., No. C 13-03663 CRB (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint] (explaining that many mortgage backed securities are held
in RMBS trusts. An RMBS trust is an investment vehicle whereby financial and economic risks
are distributed by pooling mortgage loans and issuing securities or certificates for which the
mortgages serve as a collateral).
60. Complaint, supra note 59, at 9, 16.
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approximately 106,000.61 Though the city was a shipbuilding center during
World War II, it now has a poverty rate of 17%—a figure that is 3% higher
than the California average.62 Roughly 38% of Richmond homeowners—more
than 7,000 people—are underwater on their mortgages,63 compared with 19%
nationally.64 In just three years, 2,000 of Richmond’s homes have gone into
foreclosure.65 The issue, however, is not constrained to Richmond.66
Nationwide, 23% of those with home loans owed at least 25% more than their
property is worth, and 7.1 million homes with mortgages were underwater at
the end of the second quarter of 2013.67 The consequences of these underwater
mortgages become significant when homeowners are unable to continue
making payments and the owners default on their loan obligations.68
While foreclosure can be devastating to individual homeowners, its costs
are shared by the community.69 As discussed above, some of the challenges
associated with foreclosure and abandonment include neighborhood blight,
transience, and an unkempt appearance.70 Homeowners will sometimes gut and
abandon their homes, leading to squatters and crime.71 When one home in a
city neighborhood becomes dilapidated or vacant, the people living in
neighboring homes are left to deal with the consequences of the appearance of
the unkempt home and the potential for illegal activity.72 With small lot sizes
and densely populated city neighborhoods, the value of each home is tied to
that of the others in the neighborhood.73 As homes lose value, owners may no
longer choose to invest in them because the return on capital improvements is

61. Michael B. Marois, Richmond, California, May Abandon Plan to Seize Mortgages,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 7, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-07/richmond-californiamay-abandon-plan-to-seize-mortgages.html; see also U.S. Census Bureau, Richmond (city),
California: State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/06/0660620.html (last revised Dec. 4, 2014).
62. Alison Vekshin, Richmond, California, Advances Mortgage Reduction Plan,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-11/richmond-californiaadvances-mortgage-reduction-plan.html.
63. Id.
64. Dewan, supra note 10.
65. Lydia Depillis, Richmond’s Rules: Why One California Town is Keeping Wall Street Up
at Night, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
10/05/richmonds-rules-why-one-california-town-is-keeping-wall-street-up-at-night/.
66. See Vekshin, supra note 62.
67. Vekshin, supra note 62.
68. MRP, supra note 9, at 5.
69. See Samsa, supra note 1, at 191.
70. MRP, supra note 9, at 5.
71. Simeone Foxman, Eminent Domain: This City’s Plan to Expropriate Mortgages Aims to
Make Wall St Pay for the Housing Bubble, QUARTZ, Aug. 8 2013, http://qz.com/113250/this-cit
ys-plan-to-expropriate-mortgages-could-make-wall-st-pay-for-the-housing-bubble/.
72. Kelly, supra note 3, at 212.
73. Id.
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too low.74 As the neighborhoods decline, investors may forego making
investments in the area.75 It becomes a vicious cycle. Though banks, which
often become owners of properties after foreclosure, are required to take care
of the homes and keep them up to code, they have not always followed
through, as is apparent in Richmond.76 With so many homes in foreclosure,
Richmond began fining banks $1,000 a day if they failed to maintain the
properties.77 To date, the city has collected approximately $1.5 million from
the banks.78 Further, a city’s tax base moves out with the homeowners,
draining municipal resources and making it more difficult to care for the newly
dilapidated neighborhoods.79 When this snowball begins to roll, it becomes
difficult for cities to redevelop these neighborhoods.80 Richmond believes that
nearly half of the private mortgages in Richmond will go into foreclosure.81
This could cost Richmond $25 million.82
Banks have given some mortgage relief, but according to McLaughlin,
most of this relief has come in the form of short sales, which means that
families are still losing homes and neighborhoods are losing stability.83 Banks
are limited in the relief they can give because the mortgages are generally sold
to investors as mortgage-backed securities or RMBS trusts. McLaughlin
claims that even when the banks have modified loans, the modifications are not
enough to solve the problem.84
While lenders must attempt to negotiate modifications before foreclosing
on homeowners under California law,85 these modifications may not always
happen. In a letter to Bank of America, California representative George Miller
wrote that more than 568,000 of borrowers who had been foreclosed upon had

74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See Dewan, supra note 10.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191; See also MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 141
(1st ed. 2002) (“If a window is broken and left unrepaired, people will conclude that no one cares
and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken and the sense of anarchy will spread
from the building to the street on which it faces, sending a signal that anything goes.”). “Gladwell
goes on to illustrate how superficial, but highly visible details in our everyday environment shape
our behavior. In a subway system overwhelmed by graffiti, muggings just seem natural; somehow
both the perpetrator and the victim know this and act accordingly.” Kelly, supra note 3, at 212.
80. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191.
81. Complaint, supra note 59, at 11.
82. Id. at 24.
83. Laura Flanders, Meet the Mayor Who’s Using Eminent Domain to Fight Foreclosure,
NATION, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/177296/meet-mayor-whos-using-emi
nent-domain-fight-foreclosure.
84. Id.
85. Complaint, supra note 59, at 24.
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not been contacted by their mortgage servicer to modify their loans.86 In fact,
there have been multiple lawsuits threatened and/or filed over banks’ failure to
modify loans.87 For example, a prominent New York prosecutor plans to file a
lawsuit against Wells Fargo over alleged violations of a $25 billion mortgage
settlement.88 Similarly, the New York attorney general has threatened suit
against both Bank of America and Wells Fargo, alleging that the banks have
not lived up to a mortgage pact that required them to improve their interactions
with borrowers needing loan modification.89
Part of the difficulty with loan modification, however, occurs due to the
structure of the trusts. Since the RMBS trusts are owned by many different
investors, they became much more difficult to modify because any change
required the signature of so many parties.90 While nearly one hundred of the
targeted homes had received loan modification that included debt forgiveness
as of January 2014, these modifications are not always sustainable.91
All of these problems have forced Richmond’s city officials to take action
“to stabilize neighborhoods, to fight blight, [and] to keep homeowners in their
homes.”92 The city’s plan for action, however, has been controversial to say the
least.
IV. THE PLAN
In response to the prevalence of blight and foreclosures, Richmond has
created the “Richmond CARES Program”93 and enlisted the help of the private
financing company MRP.94 MRP is currently a privately owned, for-profit
investment firm based in San Francisco.95 For its part, MRP will raise funds to
finance the Richmond Plan, identify the mortgage loans to be acquired through
eminent domain, and arrange for the refinancing of seized loans.96 It is worth
noting that MRP has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and

86. Letter from George Miller to Mr. Brian Moynihan, President and Chief Exec. Officer,
Bank of America Corp. (Sept. 10, 2013) (on file with author).
87. See Andrew R. Johnson, New York Plans Action on Alleged Mortgage Violations, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 1, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023036433045791098
30928878264.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Depillis, supra note 65.
91. Dewan, supra note 10.
92. Carolyn Said, Richmond Pushes Forward with Eminent Domain Plan, SFGATE, Dec. 18,
2013, http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Richmond-pushes-forward-with-eminent-domainplan-5073950.php (quoting Gayle McLaughlin).
93. Flanders, supra note 83.
94. Dewan, supra note 10.
95. Complaint, supra note 59, at 16.
96. Id. at 9.
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plans to become publicly owned.97 MRP has entered into discussion with
multiple local governments about using eminent domain to seize residential
mortgages, but Richmond is the first city that has decided to implement the
plan, though it has not yet taken action.98 Eminent domain theoretically solves
the problem caused by RMBS trusts’ joint-ownership of loans—the struggle to
coordinate effectively to take action99—because the government action can
facilitate the exchange without having to gather signatures from all trust
owners.100
Richmond and MRP plan to either purchase or use Richmond’s eminent
domain power to seize approximately 624 homes that are underwater101 so they
can “retake control over the welfare of their neighborhoods and their fiscal
solvency.”102 Once an underwater loan is chosen, Richmond will purchase or
seize the loan for roughly 80% of the home’s current value.103 The city will
pay for this with money from MRP, which will then own the mortgage.104
After securing the loan, Richmond will refinance the old loan and replace it
with a new loan worth approximately 95% of the underlying home value,105 an
amount that will be more manageable for homeowners.106 For example, if the
Smiths are underwater on a home worth $200,000, Richmond will seize the
mortgage using eminent domain, paying $160,000 to the trust, which is 80% of
the value of the home.107 Richmond will then refinance the loan for $190,000,
leaving a difference of $30,000.108 Richmond will receive 5% of this spread (in
this case, $9,500).109 MRP will receive a flat fee of $4,500 for each seizure,
and may receive further compensation if they arrange the refinancing of the
mortgage.110 Investors of MRP will receive any money left over from the
taking.111 Notably, Richmond and MRP are targeting loans that are current or

97. Mailing from West Contra Costa Association of REALTORS, Don’t Let Wall Street
Take Another Bite Out of Richmond Homes [hereinafter Realtor Mailing] (on file with author).
98. Complaint, supra note 59, at 17.
99. Dewan, supra note 10.
100. Depillis, supra note 65.
101. During the summer of 2013, underwater homeowners owed an average of 45% more
than the value of their homes. Dewan, supra note 10.
102. MRP, supra note 9, at 4.
103. Complaint, supra note 59, at 21.
104. Depillis, supra note 65.
105. Complaint, supra note 59, at 21.
106. Depillis, supra note 65.
107. See Complaint, supra note 59, at 21.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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from borrowers who appear likely to repay their loans.112 This plan is the
brainchild of three different professors—Robert Hockett of Cornell Law,113
Lauren Willis of Loyola University, and Howell Jackson of Harvard—who
came up with the plan simultaneously but independently.114
MRP’s program is a response to real problems.115 The Federal Reserve
Board cites three key forces at the root of these problems, resulting from
within the housing market.116 First, there is a persistent excess supply of vacant
homes on the market, several stemming from foreclosures.117 Second, there has
been a significant downshift in the availability of mortgage credit, and there is
no telling when this will turn around.118 Finally, foreclosure procedures are
inefficient and impose great costs on homeowners, lenders, and
communities.119 Richmond and MRP’s plan seeks to benefit both individual
homeowners and the community as a whole.120 On the individual level, the
partners seek to save homeowners money and preserve home ownership
equity, allowing homeowners to remain in their homes.121 This will stabilize
the broader community by reducing and preventing blight.122 Further,
homeowners with reduced mortgage payments will be able to spend that
money on local businesses, adding money to the local economy and
stimulating community wealth.123 However, as already noted, the plan has been
met with staunch resistance from several sources, including but not limited to
mortgage holders, the FHFA, and a group of Richmond realtors.124

112. Under the MRP business model, a loan seizure will not be profitable unless the seized
loan can be refinanced or the amount paid to compensate the RMBS trusts would be
unreimbursed. Unless it targets performing homeowners with good credit ratings, MRP could
have a difficult time selling the new loan to investors. MRP, supra note 9, at 19–20.
113. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 149–57 (2012), for a more detailed
discussion of the Richmond Plan.
114. Depillis, supra note 65.
115. Kelly F. Heudepohl, Comment, A Life Raft for Underwater Mortgages? Whether the
Federal Constitution Permits State and Local Governments to Condemn Home Mortgage
Contracts to Solve the Housing Crisis, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 275, 281 (2012).
116. Jennifer Burnett, CSG Staff Speaks to KY Task Force on Foreclosures, CSG
KNOWLEDGE CENTER, Dec. 6, 2012, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/csg-staff-speaksky-task-force-foreclosures.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Complaint, supra note 59, at 54.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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V. THE LAWSUIT
This resistance culminated in two lawsuits: one headed by Wells Fargo
Bank and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustees for hundreds of
residential mortgage-backed trusts that hold the targeted mortgage loans,125
and the other by Bank of New York Mellon, U.S. Bank, and Wilmington Trust
Co.126 Though the district court in the former lawsuit dismissed the banks’
motion for a preliminary injunction,127 the banks have said they will continue
their resistance against the city and MRP’s plan if eminent domain action is
taken.128 Until and unless such action is taken, however, the banks have
dismissed their lawsuit.129
On September 16, 2013, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of California Charles R. Breyer dismissed the banks’ claims because
the claims were not yet ripe.130 Judge Breyer held that because the claims do
not rest on contingent future events certain to occur, but rather rest on future
events that may never occur, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring
suit.131 Until Richmond actually takes action and uses its eminent domain
power to seize mortgages, it would appear that the courts will not step in.132
Even within the city, there seems to be a lot of disagreement about whether
the plan is the best course of action. At its first vote on the Richmond Plan in
April of 2013, the city council voted unanimously in its favor.133 However,
when McLaughlin attempted to move forward with the plan in September of
2013, the Richmond Plan passed with just four of seven votes.134 According to
Richmond realtor Jess Wright, “the underwater mortgage bailout program is on
life support.”135 This internal dissent could explain why Richmond has not yet
taken action and may signal that the banks will not need to file another lawsuit.

125. Id.
126. Phyllis Skupien, Quick Ruling Denied in Dispute over California Town’s Mortgage
Seizure Plan, THOMSON REUTERS, Oct. 16, 2013, available at http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/in
dex.php/quick-ruling-denied-in-dispute-over-california-towns-mortgage-seizure-plan/.
127. Depillis, supra note 65.
128. Id.
129. Forgione, supra note 35.
130. Dan Levine, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond, California Mortgage Plan,
THOMSON REUTERS, Sept. 16, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/ususa-mortgages-ruling-idUSBRE98F12M20130 916.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Dewan, supra note 10.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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The Stakes

The stakes are high on both sides. If Richmond and MRP take eminent
domain action and lose in court, the city could find itself in serious debt
because it was unable to get insurance to shield itself from such a loss.136 This
is especially pertinent because the city attempted to pass a $34 million bond
issuance to refinance some of its earlier debt, but could not find investors for
the bonds.137 MRP has already spent more than $7 million to promote its plan
and pay legal fees.138 Yet the opponents’ stakes are also very high, especially
because a victory for the Richmond Plan could encourage numerous other
municipalities to follow suit, taking underwater mortgages even when they are
performing.139 This could cost RMBS trusts billions of dollars.140
B.

Current Status

Richmond has not taken action yet, likely due in part to a divide of opinion
within the city council.141 Though three council members back McLaughlin,
the vice mayor and two council members, who are concerned that the plan will
subject Richmond to crushing legal liabilities that may not be covered by
MRP, have met McLaughlin with opposition.142 In a letter, Councilman Nat
Bates has called the plan “ill advised,” asserting that if the plan continues to
move forward, he will push to take the issue to voters.143
However, in a 4–2 vote on December 17, 2013, the Richmond City
Council voted to set guidelines for using eminent domains to take mortgages in
an effort to prevent foreclosures.144 While the council would currently need a
five-vote supermajority to take action, Richmond does have the power to, with
a majority vote, set up a joint powers authority that could unilaterally authorize
eminent domain with its own supermajority vote.145 If the plan does move
forward, council members have agreed to prioritize target locations by
beginning the eminent domain plan in the neighborhoods that were hit hardest
by the foreclosure crisis.146 If Richmond takes eminent domain action, the
banks have pledged that their lawsuit will be “immediately re-filed.”147

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Depillis, supra note 65.
Id.
See infra Part VII.C.
See infra Part VII.C.
See infra Part VII.C.
Said, supra note 92.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Forgione, supra note 35.
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VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY
There has been much debate regarding whether Richmond’s proposed
action is constitutional.148 This article focuses primarily on the Takings Clause,
but gives a brief overview of some of the other constitutional arguments. The
Supreme Court has set a precedent for the use of eminent domain under the
Takings Clause in decisions such as Berman v. Parker,149 Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,150 and Kelo v. City of New London.151 Yet while Berman,
Midkiff, and Kelo showed great deference to legislative judgment,152 forty-two
states responded to the Kelo decision by enacting legislation or passing ballot
measures to limit the circumstances under which the government could use its
eminent domain power to take property when using economic development as
a legitimate public purpose.153 Further, while Supreme Court precedents allow
an expansive definition of “public use,” several lower court decisions in the
twenty-first century invalidated the use of eminent domain as a means of
acquiring real estate for particular entities.154
It is important to note that though Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo dealt with the
transfer of real property, courts have consistently permitted the seizure of
intangible property under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.155 In fact, in

148. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652 (Aug. 6,
2012). See generally Complaint, supra note 59.
149. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
150. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
151. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
152. Id. at 487–88.
153. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain Overview, NCSL,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/eminent-domain-overview.aspx
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (explaining that between 2005 and 2011, forty-two states enacted
legislation or passed ballot measures in response to Kelo; these measures either restricted the use
of eminent domain for economic development, defined “public use,” established additional
criteria for designating blighted areas subject to eminent domain, strengthened public notice,
public hearing, and landowner negotiation criteria, or required compensation at greater than fair
market value).
154. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, at 1222–23 (citing Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City
Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (invalidating condemnation of recycling center for
retransfer to auto race track for use as a parking lot); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60
Fed. App’x 123 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating condemnation of lease in shopping center for
retransfer to another store for expansion); Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d
102 (N.J. Super. 1998) (invalidating condemnation of land for future expansion of a commercial
casino); Wayne Cnty. v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (holding that property cannot
be condemned and retransferred to a commercial entity when the sole rationale is economic
development)).
155. Foushee, supra note 25, at 77; see, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States,
274 U.S. 215, 220 (1927) (tobacco contracts); In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 212,
221 (1966) (bus operating routes and schedules); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d
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its City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders decision, the California Supreme Court
held that the right of eminent domain encompasses property of every kind.156
A.

The Takings Clause

As noted above, one of the major criticisms of the Richmond Plan is that it
violates the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.157 Implicated by
the Takings Clause are the requirements that for a municipality or
governmental body to take private property, the taking must be “rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose”158 and the government must pay “just
compensation” for the property.159
1. Public Purpose
In order to analyze the Richmond Plan in terms of “public purpose,” it is
important to look at the relevant United States Supreme Court precedents, the
first of which is Berman v. Parker. In Berman, the Supreme Court upheld the
use of eminent domain where the District of Columbia attempted to take all
rights to the land located in a particular area for the purpose of redeveloping a
blighted area.160 Though not all of the property taken by the District of
Columbia was blighted161 and some of the property taken was given to private
parties,162 the use of eminent domain was held to be lawful. First, the Court
stated that the police power is broad and the role of the judiciary in
determining whether that power is being properly used is extremely narrow.163
Next, the Court held that “public purpose” is a broad concept and the
revitalization of blighted communities is a recognized public purpose.164 The

656, 668 (1982) (a sports franchise); Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1333–35 (5th Cir.
1973) (the right to exploit the collector’s value of Lee Harvey Oswald’s personal effects).
156. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d. 656 (1982).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (providing that private property may be taken only for a
“public use”).
158. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
159. Id.
160. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
161. The appellants in Berman owned a department store and claimed that their property
could not be taken because it was commercial, was itself blighted, and would be given to a private
rather than public agency for redevelopment to serve a private rather than public use. Id. at 31.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 32 (“An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case
must turn on its own facts . . . . Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”).
164. Id. at 33 (“The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary . . . . If those who govern
the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the fifth amendment that stands in the way.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

198

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV:181

Court made clear that as soon as a public purpose is established, eminent
domain is a means to an end and allows transfer of property from one private
party to other private parties as part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan.165
After all, the public end may be equally as or better served by a private
enterprise than a public agency, and the legislature is in a better position than
the court to make this determination.166 Finally, the Court held that eminent
domain need not be used on a structure-by-structure basis, but instead may be
used on an entire area, even when not all of the buildings are blighted.167
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court again analyzed “public purpose” in
the landmark case Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. In Midkiff, the Court
was asked to determine whether the Hawaii Housing Authority could exercise
eminent domain to take property from large private landholders and distribute
it among private parties in order to break up a land oligopoly, which began
when Hawaii was first settled.168 Again deferring to the legislature, the Court
held that where the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, eminent domain is allowed even if it ultimately
results in transfer of property from one private party to another.169 Condemned
property need not be put into use for the general public, and the mere fact that
property taken by eminent domain is transferred immediately to private
beneficiaries does not mean that the taking has only a private purpose.170 The
Court, stating that regulating an oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a
classic exercise of a state’s police power, held that Hawaii’s approach was
comprehensive and rational.171 Finally, the Court held that whether the
provision actually accomplished the objectives it sought to achieve was

165. Id. (“For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.”).
166. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–34 (“But the means of executing the project are for Congress
and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established . . . . We cannot
say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community
redevelopment projects.”).
167. Id. at 34.
168. When Polynesian immigrants settled the Hawaiian Islands, the settlers developed a
feudal land tenure system where the island high chief controlled all land and assigned it to
subchiefs for development. All land was eventually returned to the trust of the high chief; thus
there was no private ownership of land. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231
(1984).
169. Id. at 241.
170. Id. at 243–44.
171. Id. at 241–42 (“The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original
13 Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly . . . . [That
has] created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State’s residential land market
and forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath
their homes.”).
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irrelevant.172 In order to meet constitutional requirements, the legislature
simply must rationally believe that the act would promote its objective.173
The final case discussed in this section is Kelo v. City of New London, a 5–
4 Supreme Court decision involving a development plan that was projected to
create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, and revitalize an economically
distressed city.174 Though none of the petitioners’ properties were in a blighted
or poor condition,175 the city’s use of eminent domain satisfied the “public use”
requirement of the Fifth Amendment as part of a comprehensive economic
development plan.176 Citing Berman and Midkiff heavily,177 the Court, not
surprisingly, deferred to the legislature,178 noting the comprehensive character
of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, the limited
scope of the court’s review, and the broad understanding of public purpose.179
Further, the Court rejected the contention that this was a one-to-one transfer of
property from citizen A to citizen B outside the confines of an integrated
plan.180 The pursuit of a public purpose may benefit individual private parties,
and this is allowed as long as it is part of a comprehensive economic
development plan.181 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that takings for
purely economic purposes should require “reasonable certainty” that the
expected public benefits would actually accrue.182 When the legislature’s
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, the wisdom of such
takings is not to be debated.183
Kelo and other precedents provide strong support that eminent domain may
be properly used for economic development, increasing the tax base, and
172. Id. at 242.
173. Id.
174. The city of New London, which had an unemployment rate nearly double that of the
state and a population at its lowest since 1920, was considered a “distressed municipality” by a
state agency. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). The development plan
sought to build commercial buildings, a pedestrian riverwalk, residences, a public walkway, a
museum, a state park, and office space, among other things. Id. at 474.
175. Id. at 475.
176. See id. at 469.
177. The Court also cited Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), a case dealing
with provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act under which the
Environmental Protection Agency could consider data (including trade secrets) submitted by a
prior pesticide applicant in evaluating a subsequent application so long as the second applicant
paid just compensation for the data. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
178. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (“Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of
federalism, emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in
discerning local public needs.”).
179. Id. at 484.
180. Id. at 487.
181. Id. at 485.
182. Id. at 487–88.
183. Id. at 488.
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combating blight—the very ends the Richmond Plan is designed to achieve.184
Further, simply because a private party benefits from the government’s pursuit
of a public purpose does not mean that a transfer is improper.185 The reasoning
behind this is that public ownership is not necessarily the only, nor the best,
way to serve a public end.186 Yet it is important to note that the circumstances
surrounding Kelo and the Richmond Plan are different. In Kelo, the City of
New London planned a comprehensive redevelopment project, which included
a number of new buildings and parks aimed at improving the city’s economic
condition, recreational space, and aesthetic appeal.187 In contrast, the
Richmond Plan aims solely to transfer mortgages from one group of investors
to another, leaving homeowners in place and casting doubt as to whether this
can truly constitute a “comprehensive redevelopment project” aimed at serving
a public purpose.188 The Richmond Plan, then, may better be likened to
Midkiff, where the Hawaii Housing Authority took large plots of land from
private parties and distributed those plots among other private parties in order
to break up a land oligopoly, which began when Hawaii was first settled189 and
“created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State’s residential
land market.”190 Richmond, then, may be able to make a plausible argument
that the purpose of the Richmond Plan is to take and redistribute unjust
mortgages that deter the normal functioning of Richmond’s residential land
market.191 If the court is able to see a parallel between these “public use”
arguments, Richmond will succeed on this point. Still, where the police power
is difficult to define and each case must turn on its own facts, it is difficult to
determine how a court will rule.192
While combating blight seems to clearly be a “public purpose,” Richmond
may have a difficult time explaining that its action is “reasonably related” to
such public purpose. This is because loan modifications are not necessarily
correlated to the likelihood that a homeowner will default,193 meaning that the
Richmond Plan may not actually do anything to prevent blight, crime,
184. See Kelo, 545 U.S at 483–84.
185. Id. at 485.
186. Id. at 486 (“The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private
enterprise than through a department government—or so the Congress might conclude.”).
187. See Foushee, supra note 26, at 93–94 (explaining that the comprehensive redevelopment
project included a waterfront conference hotel, marinas, a pedestrian riverwalk, a Coast Guard
museum, a state park, and 90,000 square feet of office space).
188. See id. at 94.
189. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984).
190. Id. at 242.
191. See id.
192. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The definition [of police power] is
essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.”).
193. Foushee, supra note 26, at 85.
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transience, or the reduction of the tax base. In its 2012 Review of Options
Available for Underwater Borrowers and Principal Forgiveness, the FHFA
found that a borrower’s post-modification loan-to-value ratio has little effect
on whether the borrower will continue to perform on the loan.194 Among
homeowners who received loan modifications, those with a post-modification
loan-to-value ratio of 80% were only 2% more likely to stay current and
perform on their loan than homeowners with a post-modification loan-to-value
ratio of 190%.195 It follows, then, that even if MRP is able to refinance the
mortgages, the loan modification may not have much effect on halting
foreclosure. However, the Kelo majority rejected the requirement that there be
“reasonable certainty” that the expected public benefits would actually accrue,
instead holding that “if a legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are
not irrational,” courts should not delve into the wisdom of takings.196
Even if one does not consider the wisdom of the Richmond Plan, Kelo
makes clear that a city may not take property under the pretext of a public
purpose when its actual goal is to confer a private benefit, nor may a city adopt
a development plan in order to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals.197 The Court in Kelo asserts that a one-to-one transfer of property,
executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, “would
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot.”198 Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo discusses factors that should be
considered in determining whether there is a plausible accusation of
impermissible favoritism to private parties.199 Though at least one of these

194. Id. (citing FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REVIEW OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR
UNDERWATER BORROWERS AND PRINCIPAL FORGIVENESS (July 31, 2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Research/Pages/Review-of-Options-Available-forUnderwater-Borrowers-and-Principal-Forgiveness.aspx).
195. Foushee, supra note 26, at 85 (“A homeowner with a post-modification LTV of 80
percent or less had a 72 percent likelihood of remaining current and performing on his loans for
the first 12 months after modification, while a homeowner with a post-modification LTV of 190
percent or higher had a 70 percent likelihood of staying current and performing during that same
period.”).
196. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005).
197. Id. at 478 (“Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. The takings before us,
however, would be executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan . . . .
Therefore, as was true of the statute challenged in Midkiff, the City’s development plan was not
adopted ‘to benefit a particular class of identifiable individual.’”).
198. Id. at 487.
199. Id. at 491–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (highlighting, in the specific Kelo context, (1)
that New London had a depressed economic condition and that there was evidence corroborating
its validity, (2) that there was a substantial commitment of public funds by the state to the
development project before most of the private beneficiaries were known, (3) that the city
reviewed a variety of development plans before choosing a private developer, (4) that the city
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factors was met— Richmond is facing depressed economic conditions, and this
can be corroborated with evidence200—others are called into question. For
example, did Richmond commit substantial public funds before the private
beneficiaries were known?201 Did the city review a variety of development
plans?202 Was MRP chosen from a group of applicants before Richmond
decided upon using eminent domain?203 While the answers to these questions
are somewhat unclear, it is likely MRP and Richmond worked on the plan
together.204 In fact, McLaughlin began considering the idea after hearing about
it from MRP and the Alliance of Californians for Community
Empowerment.205 Further, unlike in Kelo, where several projects benefitting
several private parties were part of the economic development plan,206 the
Richmond Plan will solely benefit MRP and the homeowners whose mortgages
are refinanced.207 In their complaint, the banks went so far as to say that the
Richmond Plan is a seizure of property from one private party to another
private party, with “Richmond receiving a small cut of the profits as its fee for
renting out its eminent domain powers.”208 Finally, Richmond’s plan
specifically targets mortgages held by private-label RMBS trusts as opposed to
those held by trusts sponsored and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, or those held directly by banks.209 One must wonder why, if the
Richmond Plan’s true purpose is keeping Richmond citizens in their homes in
order to prevent crime, blight, transience, and so forth, the plan does not target
all underwater mortgages.210 However, it may be that instead, Richmond is
targeting loans held by RMBS trusts because they are particularly difficult to
modify211 and thus require eminent domain. This argument directs our

chose from a group of applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand, and
(5) that other private beneficiaries of the project are still unknown).
200. Id. at 491.
201. Id. at 492.
202. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492.
203. Id.
204. Nick Timiraos, Investor Group Sues Richmond, Calif., over Eminent Domain Plan,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873245225045786546
90187664354.html (“The city is teaming up with Mortgage Resolution Partners, a private
investment firm based in San Francisco.”).
205. Dewan, supra note 10.
206. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474.
207. Foushee, supra note 26, at 94.
208. Complaint, supra note 59, at 19.
209. Id. at 20.
210. Wells Fargo et al. posit that RMBS loans are targeted because they and their
certificateholders are too dispersed to coordinate meaningful resistance. Id.
211. Richmond and MRP claim that private-label RMBS trusts are inefficient because some
of their governing documents prohibit loan servicers from permanently reducing a borrower’s
principal balance. Id.
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attention back to the Midkiff analysis. In Midkiff, the public purpose was
reducing the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly, which
created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the state’s residential
land market.212 In Richmond, the public purpose may be reducing the
perceived social and economic evils of unjust mortgage rates, which do not
allow homeowners to remain in their homes and thus decimate neighborhoods.
2. Just Compensation
Beyond issues with the public use requirement, there are some major
concerns about whether Richmond will provide homeowners with “just
compensation” for the takings. The Fifth Amendment’s “just compensation”
requirement means that in order to be a constitutional taking, cities must pay
an amount equal to the property’s fair market value, or the price that would be
agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer.213 The Supreme Court
defined “just compensation” as the “full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken” when the property is seized.214 However, this is an issue of
first impression—courts have never determined what just compensation means
in relation to the seizure of mortgages.215
While courts have not considered mortgage seizures specifically, courts
have considered the rights of secured creditors in other settings. In Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the Frazier-Lemke Amendment (the “Amendment”) to the
Bankruptcy Act, which prevented distribution of a person’s property despite
default.216 According to the Amendment, a debtor who filed for bankruptcy
was entitled to a stay of all proceedings for five years while retaining
possession of the property in question, as long as the debtor paid rent
annually.217 The debtor had the right, at any time during or at the end of the
five years, to request reappraisal of the real estate and pay the reappraised
price.218 The Court held that a statute enacted for the relief of a mortgagor,
when applied to a preexisting mortgage, would only be constitutional if it
allowed the mortgagee to obtain substantial payment of the indebtedness.219 If

212. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984).
213. Lee, supra note 24, at 593.
214. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943).
215. A mortgage note is intangible property, defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as a “lien
against property that is granted to secure an obligation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 313 (9th ed.
2009); see also Foushee, supra note 26, at 97.
216. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
217. Id. at 575–76.
218. Id.at 576.
219. Id. at 581 (“Statutes for the relief of mortgagors, when applied to preexisting mortgages,
have given rise, from time to time, to serious constitutional questions. The statutes were sustained
by this Court when . . . they were found to preserve substantially the right of the mortgagee to
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the right of the mortgagee is substantially abridged, the law must be stricken
down.220 A modified version of the Amendment was addressed and ultimately
upheld by the Supreme Court two years later in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the
Mountain Trust Bank.221 Since the length of the stay was reduced and new
protections were offered to farm creditors, the Court held that the creditor’s
security interest was not substantially impaired by the act.222 Finally, in Wright
v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court asserted that a
creditor’s constitutional rights were protected as long as there were safeguards
in place to protect the right of secured creditors “to the extent of the value of
the property.”223 As these cases show, a secured creditor has a constitutional
right to seek the value of his or her property or collateral.224
In this situation, however, Richmond and MRP do not plan to pay the
value of the mortgages, but instead will only be paying 80% of the value of the
home.225 MRP’s president, Steve Gluckstern, argues that the amount the
company would pay for the mortgages is fair market value because it is equal
to the value Fannie Mae assigned to its securities in financial filing disclosures,
based on the amount of loans expected to default.226 Further, since creditors
typically do not gain the full value of a home when a house is sold through
foreclosure, MRP argues that the appraised value of the home is higher than
the creditor could expect to recover.227 Notably, the difference between the
amount paid by MRP and the current value of the mortgages could result in a
return of up to 30% for MRP’s investors.228
In order to accept MRP’s position, one would have to accept the
assumption that each of the underwater homes would actually default on its
loan and fall into foreclosure.229 However, this is highly unlikely. Richmond’s
plan targets loans that are currently performing and have a low risk of
default—it is the only way MRP’s plan will be financially feasible.230 In

obtain, through the application of security, payment of the indebtedness. They were stricken
down . . . when it appeared that this substantive right was substantially abridged.”).
220. Id.
221. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937).
222. Foushee, supra note 26, at 99–100.
223. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940).
224. Foushee, supra note 26, at 100.
225. Id. at 96.
226. Jon Prior, Still No Partner for Radical Mortgage Resolution, POLITICO, Jan. 16, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/still-no-partner-for-radical-mortgage-resolution-8623
3.html.
227. See Foushee, supra note 26, at 101.
228. Prior, supra note 226.
229. Foushee, supra note 26, at 102.
230. There are somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 mortgage loans, in Richmond alone, that
meet the MRP profile. The seizure of these mortgages could cause tens of millions of dollars in
losses to the RMBS trusts and their beneficiaries. Complaint, supra note 59, at 13.
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Richmond, approximately 70% of the homes targeted are current on their
payments,231 and simply because a home has lost value due to the downturn of
the housing market does not mean that its owners will stop payments on the
home.232 Further, the Richmond Plan disregards the money generated by the
interest payments coming from performing mortgages.233 When a mortgage
lender extends a loan of $125,000 at a 3.5% interest rate over a thirty-year
period, the lender may expect that the loan will generate $77,070.10 in interest
income during the period of the loan.234 This loss is not accounted for by
MRP’s valuation. Thus, the loss to the holders of the RMBS trusts are twofold;
they are paid 20% less than the value of the home and are immediately cut off
from the cash flow generated by principal and interest repayments.235
The Richmond Plan will have a difficult time surviving a Takings Clause
challenge. Though Kelo and other precedent gave significant deference to the
legislative branch in determining what constitutes public purpose, MRP and
Richmond will have to overcome the argument that the Richmond Plan is
intended to favor MRP with only incidental public benefits.236 Even if the
Richmond Plan succeeds, it will have a difficult time constituting “just
compensation,” as MRP will pay only 85% of the underlying value of the
home though approximately 70% of the loans targeted are at low risk of default
and the Richmond Plan fails to account for losses in interest payments.237
B.

Other Constitutional Arguments

Beyond the Takings Clause, critics of the plan have made other
constitutional arguments. The banks argue that in allowing citizens who do not
live in Richmond to seize notes that are held outside of Richmond, the city’s
use of eminent domain would violate California’s statutory prohibitions against
extraterritorial seizures.238 Moreover, the banks believe that Richmond’s action
would violate both the Contracts Clause, which prevents a local government

231. Timiraos, supra note 204.
232. Foushee, supra note 26, at 101.
233. Id. at 105–06.
234. Id. at 106.
235. Id.
236. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does not, however, alter the
fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only
incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”).
237. See supra Part VI.A.2.
238. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (prohibiting local governments from seizing extraterritorial
property); Complaint, supra note 59, at 34 (“The Fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits a local government from extraterritorially seizing property pursuant to eminent domain
powers.”).
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from abrogating debts of local residents held by creditors,239 and the dormant
commerce clause doctrine, which prevents local governments from
discriminating against out-of-state investors or erecting barriers to interstate
commerce that benefit the state’s economy.240 The banks argue that in
benefiting its local economy, Richmond’s action would come at the expense of
an important sector of interstate commerce—the interstate market for
mortgage-backed securities.241 This, in turn, will affect numerous Americans
because this portion of the home loan industry enables people to buy homes.242
The banks’ final constitutional argument is that Richmond’s action would
violate the Equal Protection Clause because the proposed plan discriminates
against both the mortgage holders and certain classes of Richmond
homeowners without any legitimate purpose.243
Like the banks, the FHFA cited the constitutionality of the use and the
application of state and federal consumer laws as reasons for its opposition to
the plan, as well as concerns about Richmond and other local governments’
valuations of complex contractual arrangements traded in both national and
international markets.244 Jeff Wright, spokesman for a group of Richmond
realtors speaking out against the plan, shares this concern about the
government’s interference in private contracts.245 Wright does not want the
government to break up a contract between a lender and homeowner to help
someone who either should not have taken out a loan in the first place or who,
though underwater on his or her mortgage, can and would continue
performing.246 This, he argues, is part of the risk inherent in any investment.247
Finally, the plan would impact millions of negotiated and performing mortgage
contracts.248 In a city that is nearly two-thirds minority, the FHFA worries that
Richmond’s plan will constitute redlining, cutting off credit to a
disproportionate number of Hispanics and African Americans.249
As is apparent from the discussion in this section, the Richmond Plan is
rife with constitutional issues. Like many eminent domain actions, it will be
239. Complaint, supra note 59, at 38 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 which prohibits states
from “impairing the Obligation of Contracts”).
240. See id. at 36.
241. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the several states).
242. See id.
243. Id. at 42 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV which provides that no state shall deny any
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of its laws).
244. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652 (Aug. 6,
2012).
245. Depillis, supra note 65.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,652.
249. Depillis, supra note 65.
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challenged heavily under the Takings Clause. Yet due to its unique nature as
targeting intangible property owned by secured creditors across the country,
the Richmond Plan is exposed to numerous other constitutional challenges.
Even if the Richmond Plan is constitutional, however, it is likely not a good
idea for more practical reasons.
VII. MORE HARM THAN GOOD
Despite its creativity and best intentions, the Richmond Plan is simply not
the wisest course of action at this point in time. Even if the Richmond Plan was
able to survive a constitutional challenge, its implementation could result in
significant consequences to the very people the plan aims to help.
A.

Who Owns the Mortgages?

One of the first hurdles discussed after Richmond decided to move forward
with the Richmond Plan was the fact that the mortgages Richmond plans to
take through eminent domain are not actually owned by banks or by any one
individual entity.250 In its response to Richmond’s offer to purchase the
underwater mortgages, Wells Fargo’s assistant general counsel David Gorsche
wrote that the bank’s understanding of the law is that even if it did think the
plan made sense, the bank “does not have the contractual authority to sell the
loans251 and is not aware of any other party having the contractual authority to
sell the loans or consider [Richmond’s] offer.”252 This is because the
mortgages are held by RMBS trusts.253 The beneficiaries for these trusts
include state and local pension plans, 401(k) plans, college savings plans,
insurance companies, mutual funds, university endowments, and governmentsponsored enterprises.254 There are a couple of problems with the fragmented
ownership of the mortgages.255 If Richmond offers to purchase the mortgages,
it will be immensely difficult to track down and negotiate with the specific
owner(s) of each individual mortgage.256 If Richmond uses eminent domain to
take the mortgages, it risks violating multiple constitutional and statutory
provisions, which have already been discussed.257
Beyond its inability to sell the loans, Richmond’s plan could cause
significant economic harm to the beneficiary entities and individuals, a vast

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Vekshin, supra note 62.
Dewan, supra note 10.
Vekshin, supra note 62.
Complaint, supra note 59, at 13.
Id.
See Dewan, supra note 10.
Id.
See supra Part V.
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number of whom are retirees.258 This is because the mortgage loans that are
conveyed into RMBS trusts are carefully structured with the expectation that
most homeowners will stay in their homes and continue to pay their
mortgages.259 Representative John Campbell, a Republican from California,
said that “the savers and retirees who own these mortgages, many of them
through their pension funds and 401(k) accounts, would be exposed to serious
losses” if Richmond goes through with its plan.260
While the Richmond Plan has the potential to harm the holders of the
RMBS trusts, the plan will likely benefit a different group of investors.
B.

An Unjust Windfall

Critics are concerned that Richmond’s plan targets loans that are currently
performing and have a low risk of default, which they predict would result in
significant losses to the mortgage holders.261 After all, simply because a home
has lost value due to the downturn of the housing market does not mean that its
owners will not continue to make payments on the home.262 In fact,
approximately 70% (444 of 624) of the homes targeted are current on their
payments.263 If cities have the power to seize loans—even performing loans—
when the market declines, lenders will be forced to change their practices.264
Specifically, lenders will be forced to react by issuing loans with more
demanding terms that will exclude some from obtaining loans and purchasing

258. Complaint, supra note 59, at 13; see also Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, SIFMA
Statement Following Richmond Vote on Eminent Domain, SIFMA (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2013/sifma-statement-following-richmond-vote-on-eminent-do
main/ [hereinafter SIFMA Press Release] (“SIFMA AMG notes that the proposed plan is simply
an unlawful taking of wealth that would enrich one small group of private investors at the
expense of mortgage investors across the U.S., including everyday American savers who are
invested in mortgage-backed securities through their retirement plans and other funds.”).
259. The expectation that these mortgage loans will be paid off at full value are based on a
careful analysis of historical trends which takes into consideration the cyclical nature of the
housing market. Complaint, supra note 59, at 14.
260. John Campbell III, Campbell Introduces The Defending American Taxpayer Abusive
Government Takings Act, VOTE SMART (July 18, 2013), https://votesmart.org/public-statement/
807369/campbell-introduces-the-defending-american-taxpayers-from-abusive-government-tak
ings-act#.UwZ-nxawM0M.
261. There are somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 mortgage loans, in Richmond alone, that
meet the MRP profile. The seizure of these mortgages could cause tens of millions of dollars in
losses to the RMBS trusts and their beneficiaries. Complaint, supra note 59, at 13.
262. Foushee, supra note 26, at 104.
263. Timiraos, supra note 204.
264. Complaint, supra note 59, at 29.
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homes.265 This will harm housing markets, as lenders will be forced to reduce
the available residential loan credit and interest rates will go up.266
Even among homeowners in Richmond, the plan may favor certain loans.
Jeff Wright, a Richmond real estate agent who opposes the plan, believes that
in reality, the plan will not even affect the majority of mortgages because
eminent domain will not be used to help anyone with loans backed by Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac.267 Further, the Richmond Plan does not target loans held
by banks.268
Though the Richmond Plan stands to have a large impact on the residents
of Richmond and on the investors who happen to own mortgages in the city, its
effects could be felt much further if other cities decide to follow suit.
C. A Snowball Effect
Critics worry that if Richmond’s plan is successful, other cities will follow
in their footsteps, creating a snowball effect.269 Mayor McLaughlin assures that
the plan’s use of eminent domain would only occur in “exceptional
circumstances when large numbers of households are underwater;”270 yet the
law does not always work this way. If the banks’ lawsuit fails and Richmond is
allowed to use eminent domain to break private contracts for the public good,
it may be difficult to define “exceptional circumstances” in the future—
especially through case law, which is necessarily fact-specific and is often an
improper vehicle for creating broad policies. The FHFA further worries that
administering a program will drain judicial resources and will be rife with
administrative and judicial costs and fees.271
Several other cities have already considered the use of eminent domain to
take underwater mortgages. MRP’s eminent domain proposal has been
considered by local governments in California like San Bernardino County, El
Monte, La Puente, San Joaquin, and Orange Cove as well as by North Las
Vegas, NV, Newark, NJ, Seattle, WA, and others.272 Mayor Wayne Smith of
Irvington, New Jersey, has followed Richmond’s example and plans to move

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Dewan, supra note 10.
268. Wells Fargo et al. posit that this is because the RMBS trusts may have a more difficult
time coordinating to create meaningful resistance, whereas the banks or the federal government
may have a better chance of fighting the plan. Complaint, supra note 59, at 20; see also Tyrrell,
supra note 32.
269. See Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652
(Aug. 6, 2012).
270. Said, supra note 92.
271. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,652.
272. Complaint, supra note 59, at 11.
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forward with using eminent domain to take underwater homes.273 Irvington
plans to target the approximately 1,000 “private-label” mortgages as opposed
to going after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.274 Smith thinks that by targeting
mortgages held by banks and investors, the city may be able to avoid some of
the legal challenges of using eminent domain.275 Unlike Richmond, Irvington
has not yet agreed to work with MRP on its eminent domain plan and is
seeking investor proposals.276 Irvington asserts that the process will be fair,
open, and competitive,277 potentially shielding the city from some of the
“public use” challenges faced by Richmond.
Not only is there concern that other cities will follow suit to take
mortgages, but there is also concern that eminent domain could be used to
acquire different types of loans—for example, underwater car loans,
underwater student loans, and credit card debt.278 If other cities follow suit, or
if this legal precedent allows cities to take different types of debt for less than
its face value, the banks worry that the damages to RMBS trusts would exceed
billions of dollars.279
In the face of such staggering potential consequences, opponents are taking
the Richmond Plan seriously, combating it both through the legal system and
through investment decisions.
D. A Chilling Reality
In an effort to avoid or minimize further losses, many investors have
expressed their hesitance in lending to communities like Richmond that plan to
use eminent domain to take mortgages. Whether for punishment, selfpreservation, or both, the withholding of financing could have great
consequences for the citizens of these communities. In a public statement, the
FHFA said it “has significant concerns about the use of eminent domain to
revise existing financial contracts,” worrying that the resulting losses would
“represent a cost ultimately born by taxpayers” and would have “a chilling
effect on the extension of credit to borrowers seeking to become homeowners
and on investors that support the housing markets.”280 This is because if any
mortgage loans, even those that are highest performing, could be seized by
local governments at substantial discounts, investors will be wary of

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
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Tyrrell, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Depillis, supra note 65.
Complaint, supra note 59, at 11.
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purchasing the mortgage loans and lending banks will protect themselves by
offering loans with onerous terms.281
Officials from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA) have pointed to history to show the dangers of interfering.282 In 2002,
the Georgia mortgage market shrank by roughly 15% when the legislature
passed a law intended to prevent lenders from steering consumers to highinterest loans.283 Though the law was intended to help Georgia consumers,
lenders opposed the bill, arguing that it would inhibit their ability to make
loans to people with bad credit.284 Some lenders pulled out of the state
altogether, and two ratings agencies said that because they could be sued under
the law, they would be unable to rate Georgia loans for resale to investors.285
Despite investors’ fears, most typical thirty-year mortgages were unaffected,
and some believe that had the law remained in place, it would have mitigated
the housing crisis.286 Proponents of the Richmond Plan argue that ultimately,
any initial chilling will be short-lived because they will offer a good enough
deal to entice investors to lend.287
As this article has already touched upon, even a group of realtors from the
Richmond community has banded together in opposition of the city’s plan.288
The realtors have created a pamphlet entitled Don’t Let Wall Street Take
Another Bite Out of Richmond Homes that they sent to members of the
community,
and
they
even
launched
a
website
called
StopInvestorGreed.com.289 The realtor group’s spokesman, Jeff Wright, has
been part of Richmond’s realty business for thirty years and is the former
president of the West Contra Costa Association of REALTORS.290 He worries
that the “MRP and Wall Street Investors’ plan to seize Richmond’s underwater
mortgages will backfire and seriously harm the value of homes in
Richmond.”291 Most importantly, the realtor group is concerned that if
Richmond’s plan is followed, investors will react by refusing to lend to
Richmond and its citizens.292
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Complaint, supra note 59, at 14.
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There is some support for this argument, as investors refused to bite at a
$34 million bond issuance that the city tried to pass in July of 2014.293 Wright
likened Richmond’s bonds to a “dented can,” hypothesizing that investors will
refuse to lend in Richmond’s jurisdiction if there is a threat of taking and will
choose instead to invest in other markets.294 Scott Simon, a former managing
director of Pimco, reinforced this sentiment, questioning why a lender would
invest in an area willing to say, “I know you lent someone $100, but we are
going to say you only get $50.”295 Jonathan Lieberman, head of residential
mortgage investing at Angelo, Gordon & Co., agreed, asserting that investors
“cannot invest where [their] money is going to be expropriated—that’s a key
tenet of investing.”296 Yet the Richmond Plan may chill investments at a time
when the market is already on the upswing.
E.

Too Much and Too Late

Beyond all of the legal and practical consequences of the Richmond Plan
looming, many believe the proposed solution is coming too late. Critics of the
eminent domain plan believe that the housing market will take care of itself.297
Jeff Wright and his colleagues believe that there is no inherent harm in
foreclosure.298 If someone defaults and leaves, Richmond’s market is hot
enough that another buyer will take his or her place.299 The housing market is
on the upturn.300 The realtor group believes that there are better alternatives
and that lenders will likely work with homeowners if the homeowners are
willing to make payments.301
In January 2014, more than half of the 624 homeowners whose mortgages
Richmond planned to take through eminent domain were current on their
payments.302 Though about 28% of Richmond mortgages are deeply

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Timiraos, supra note 204.
296. Id.
297. Chris George, president of CMG Financial, one of the largest East Bay mortgage
bankers, opined that the Richmond Plan seeks to solve a problem that is solving itself, noting that
in June, median home prices in Contra Costa County posted a 31.5% year-over-year gain and
Richmond home values have increased 22.7% in the last year. Chris George, Guest Opinion:
Richmond Eminent Domain Plan is Dangerous, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013,
http://www.contracostatimes.com/opinion/ci_23975663/richmond-eminent-domain-plan-is-dan
gerous.
298. Depillis, supra note 65.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Realtor Mailing, supra note 97.
302. Dewan, supra note 10.
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underwater,303 ninety-one of the targeted loans have received loan modification
including debt forgiveness, though not all modifications have been
sustainable.304 One-third of the homeowners initially identified are no longer
underwater, according to critics of the Richmond Plan, though MRP disputes
this figure.305 The mortgage crisis seems to be improving across the United
States.306 Nationwide, from the first quarter to the second quarter of 2013, the
number of properties with negative equities has gone from 9.6 million (19.7%)
residential properties with a mortgage to 7.1 million (14.5%) residential
properties with a mortgage.307 Critics of the eminent domain plan believe that
the housing market will take care of itself.308
VIII. FINAL THOUGHTS
Richmond and cities like it have been hit hard by the burst of the housing
bubble and the great recession, meriting a real solution. However, despite the
boldness and creativity of the Richmond Plan, it simply poses too many legal
and practical consequences to be practicable at this point in time. Even if the
plan is able to overcome the constitutional challenges, its implementation will
ultimately come with great costs—costs that will be borne in large part by the
private citizens the plan aims to help. Thus, because of its constitutional and
practical consequences, the Richmond Plan will bring more harm than good.
EMILY C. CORY

303. A home is “deeply underwater” when a homeowner owes significantly more than his or
her home is worth. Richmond’s 28% figure for deeply underwater homes is higher than the
national average, which stood at 19% in January 2014. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. CORELOGIC, EQUITY REPORT: SECOND QUARTER 2013, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q2-2013-equity-report.pdf.
308. George, supra note 297.
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